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In addition, the user's profile needs to be sustained when updates occur, and the user's adjusted profile needs to be mirrored, and recovered when needed. Finally, it would be impracticable to fully lock down a consumer device, because consumers would treat the security features as foe rather than as friend, and find ways to subvert them.
Hence many settings need to be able to be overridden, both generally, but particularly for specific transactions or communications. Declaring Profiles to be Low, Medium or High Security is meaningless without an indication of the safeguards that are to be associated with each of them.
In order to offer a proposal, a comprehensive list of mainstream safeguards was first prepared, drawing in particular on ISM , pp.
The list of safeguards was then split into three groups corresponding to the three Profiles, as indicated in Table 3. A selection of these is needed in order to achieve a High Security profile, which will necessarily result in relatively Low Convenience The analysis in this section suggests that practicable baseline-security and enhanced-security are much more challenging in the consumer than in the organisational contexts, but that stratifying safeguards into Security Profiles offers a way forward.
Technology Provider Responsibility for Security Individual responsibility cannot be relied upon, in respect of either people or small organisations. On the other hand, a practicable framework for user-friendly solutions is not out of reach. This section considers whether and how IT providers can deliver such capabilities. Business organisations don't lightly take on a responsibility to help the infirm. Their reason for existing is to make money for their investors. Measures that they invest in must contribute and be seen to contribute to making money, or at least be perceived as 'a cost of being in the game'.
If an argument is to be mounted for IT providers to make security easy for their customers, then it is incumbent on the proponent to explain why they should do so. Considerable challenges are involved Anderson , a summary of which is provided in Table 4. For these reasons, a technology provider's business case for investing in security needs to be strong. Moreover, the diversity is proliferating, due to the collapse of the rational analysis and design model and of managed releases, and the rise of the 'continuous innovation', 'rapid application development', 'agile development' and 'permanent beta' memes, and the associated cavalier attitudes to software quality There is a substantial absence of provider responsibility for the consequences of security weaknesses and even of quality failures Contexts of use are diverse Many threats and vulnerabilities arise from contexts that the provider cannot control, in particular locations of use and business processes Several implementation flavours of 'Enterprise Mobility' solutions are possible, each of which endeavour to balance security and useability for corporate users Winterford , pp.
Intel, HP, Apple, Samsung , or to particular systems software e. This limits the ability of users to operate on multiple platforms, and renders them hostage to the supplier to at least some degree, and perhaps to a degree that undermines the security that the solutions nominally offer.
This is compounded by interference by governments, significantly the US government 'Container Solutions' These establish a virtual machine or other segmented area within the device, with safeguards to prevent data escaping from the container. On the other hand, they may limit the user's access to the full set of facilities available on and from their device Could such Enterprise Mobility solutions mature into effective solutions for IT-savvy organisations, and then be productised for IT-amateur organisations, and gradually become available and even mainstream for consumers?
Unfortunately, the history of computing suggests mixed experiences with dependence on such a 'trickle-down effect'. For example, although 'anti-virus software' is available, and has slowly expanded its scope to address additional forms of malware, even that sub-set of threats is not fully, conveniently and all-but-automatically addressed on all devices.
Major challenges arise from the facts of ongoing technological developments, and highly competitive marketplaces, which together ensure that change is very rapid.
Moreover, IT providers' business models are predicated on short product-lives of at most years, and rapid re-cycling of customers. In this environment, the technical contexts for which solutions are devised frequently disappear soon after the solutions are deployed.
If and when IT reaches a relatively stable plateau, a market-driven solution may emerge. On the other hand, security issues are already serious. It is untenable for millions of organisations and individuals to await that eventuality. Can the market provide productised solutions that implement something like the features and services outlined in the preceding sections and the Appendices?
And, if so, will they be affordable and accessible by the millions of small organisations and individuals that are the focus of this article? As a result of the challenges identified in Table 4 , providers of IT products and services face considerable costs in achieving reasonable degrees of security and of security-friendliness.
Moreover, it's far from clear that enough customers will recognise the value of using a security-conscious vendor. Without such an appreciation, then they are unlikely to pay a sufficient margin to enable providers to recoup the investment that is needed to deliver safer computing environments. A gap therefore exists between what's needed and what exists.
Even conservative economists agree that such market failures need to be addressed through interventions of some kind, preferably of a stimulatory nature, but where necessary through regulatory measures. The following section considers the scope for targeted interventions to give rise to the delivery of user-friendly security solutions for small organisations and consumers.
Interventions to Address Market Failure Market failure is evident, and a significant problem is not being addressed. The necessary conditions therefore exist to justify intervention. This section briefly assesses the several possible forms that intervention can take, commencing with 'incentivation' approaches and working through various ways in which requirements may be imposed on technology providers. DBCDE a and for consumers e. DBCDE b ; but the context within which they are published creates no expectation that IT providers need take any responsibility for even facilitating, let alone automating, the vital security safeguards described in the documents.
A first approach available to all governments is to apply 'moral suasion', which conveys the prospect of firmer measures should industry fail to respond to the nation's needs.
Separately, or in conjunction with moral suasion, joint government-industry programs can be developed, with government agencies making 'contributions in kind', e. Alternatively, governments may perceive the need to be of sufficient gravity that at least some aspects may be stimulated by means of subsidies to IT providers, or commissions to deliver specified features and services. While none of these approaches is by itself sufficient to achieve the objective declared earlier in this paper, a judiciously selected bundle of them may provide the catalyst needed to overcome industry and user inertia.
To date, standardisation activities have been largely limited to 'process standards' of the 'quality seal-of-approval' variety, in particular the ISO series on generic risk management processes, the ISO series on IT Risk Management processes, scaled business processes such as IASME , and to some extent NIST , One possibility would be for Standards Associations to move beyond process aspects and specify technical requirements.
In any case, industry is generally not effective in engaging with other stakeholders as part of standards formation processes.
If representatives of small organisations and of consumers are absent, or have limited influence, it is unlikely that requirements will be specified that would tend to intrude into providers' freedom to deliver insecure products. Similarly, no signs of momentum towards facilities like those discussed in this paper are apparent in professional associations internationally, e. It involves a 'light touch' legislative framework that creates the scope for enforceable Codes to be established.
In practice, however, such schemes as exist have generally been developed by industry sectors rather than negotiated among all stakeholders. Consumers are seldom well-represented in the development of such Codes, due to the lack of funding for analysis, preparation of submissions, and participation in events. Moreover, even when they are present, they have limited market power to achieve their objectives in relation to the Codes' nature, structure and content.
A variety of regulatory and oversight agencies have the legal capacity to engage with industry and other stakeholders in order to negotiate effective, enforceable Codes.
Unfortunately, the track-record of such agencies is very disappointing. This was meant to assist organisations to comply with the security safeguards Principles within the country's data protection law. With exceptions in the health care sector, all organisations to whom the Guide was addressed were large organisations in the sense used in this paper. The relevant Principles were Information Privacy Principle 4 affecting the public sector and National Privacy Principle 4 affecting most of the private sector With effect from March , these Principles were superseded by Australian Privacy Principle 11 applying to both the public and privacy sectors.
It appeared that the opportunity existed to reflect the substantial changes in technologies, threats and vulnerabilities that had occurred during the intervening decade. The document remains highly vague, with many uses of 'appropriate' 34 occurrences and 'reasonable' 74 occurrences.
It provides no indication of mandatory requirements, but merely discusses some 'steps and strategies which may be reasonable to take'. It includes brief mentions of a number of specific measures such as access control, firewalls and vulnerability scanning , but all are merely factors to consider.
The opportunity for the Privacy Commissioner to have a material impact on the demonstrably low standards of data security in Australia was spurned. Even where data protection oversight agencies have the capacity to approve industry Codes, the mechanism is not achieving the objective of ensuring that adequate IT security safeguards are implemented.
In the Australian case, it appears highly unlikely that the additional powers that the Commissioner gained in March will make any difference, because there is little incentive for industry associations to initiate Codes, and the Commissioner has no track-record of forcing the issue with industry sectors. The notion of co-regulation appears far less promising than it once did, because its potential has never yet been realised.
In many jurisdictions, statutory obligations have been enacted relating to particular industry sectors, or particular categories of data. For example, specific requirements are commonly imposed on the financial services industry and on organisations responsible for 'critical infrastructure' such as ports, airports, energy production and transmission, and telecommunications.
Since , most countries in the world have also legislated provisions in respect of data relating to an identifiable person. All data protection laws contain a security principle, and in some jurisdictions the regulatory or oversight agency has some capacity to force organisations to implement safeguards. In almost all cases, however, the Principle is expressed as a vague prescription e. The Australian oversight agency provides modest guidance, e. As indicated in the previous section, despite the gathering of a quarter-century of experience and the overwhelming evidence that organisational security practices are seriously deficient, oversight agencies continue to avoid articulating the vague principles into actionable advice.
Similar failure is evident within the EU. The EU Directive, at Article 17 Security of processing , requires "appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access However, neither the Article 29 Working Party Art. An indicator of failure is the ongoing obsession in public discourse with 'data breach notification' laws.
The movement began in California in and swept across virtually all US States. In a country that has steadfastly prioritised the freedom of corporations over the privacy rights of individuals, the intentions of these laws were to provide individuals with the opportunity to be informed and perhaps take steps to ameliorate personal harm arising from the breach, and to render transparent the poor performance of organisations in relation to the protection of personal data, and hence embarrass them into improving safeguards.
Rather than being a form of data protection law, data breach notification was, and remains, an excuse to not enact data protection law, or to not enforce existing law. A decade later, proposals for data breach notification laws appear even more vacuous than before, because it is abundantly clear both that organisations do not implement adequate security safeguards and that embarrassing them makes little difference. Even successions of instances in which breaches have cost corporations tens to hundreds of millions of dollars appear to have resulted in little improvement in corporate performance Clarke b.
The accumulation of embarrassments has, however, spurred some parliaments into action. For example, since the UK Information Commissioner has had the capacity to levy moderate fines on organisations that "deliberately or recklessly" breach data protection law. It has done so.
Fo example, its web-site discloses that, during , it levied Stg , on 8 organisations. In many countries, however, meaningful sanctions for lax security are discussed rather than enacted, and in some the regulatory agency fails to exercise the powers that they have available to them. Given the laxness of the regulatory frameworks affecting large organisations, it is unsurprising that data protection laws have little impact on the security decisions made by technology providers and by small organisations, still less on consumers.
A range of other laws have the capacity to influence organisations' attitudes to security, such as the tort of negligence and consumer protection laws.
However, although the IT industry is over 60 years old, the legal framework that applies to it remains immature. Hardware is subject to laws regarding merchantability and product liability, but software generally is not subject to those laws, unless it is intrinsic to the hardware. Most computers have in the past been sold as general-purpose devices. Providers have thereby generally escaped liability for even seriously inadequate software, unless it is so severe as to represent negligence, or is in breach of terms of contract.
There has been a rapid shift during the current decade towards the sale of computer-based appliances whose functions are restricted to a very few specific applications. This has the democratically undesirable effect of denying consumers access to general-purpose computing devices. However, it may also have the positive effect of removing the manufacturer's exemption from product liability laws.
If so, then class actions against IT providers relating to device insecurity might force them to take much greater care with their design of features and default settings.
Law reform was considered a quarter-century ago e. Clarke , and has been considered from time to time since, but with virtually no outcomes. It is entirely feasible for parliaments to enact specific organisational responsibilities and associated sanctions, in order to achieve the objective declared earlier in this paper. However, such proposals have seldom come before legislatures, and information and IT security appear not to be perceived by governments and public servants as being sufficiently important to warrant action.
Conclusions Security isn't easier for small organisations and consumers because the drivers for individual responsibility are too weak to overcome the impediments, and this problem is matched by market failure, and compounded by regulatory failure.
Devices used, and depended on, by millions of small organisations and consumers are seriously insecure. This paper has reviewed the ways in which longstanding market failure can be overcome, including stimulatory measures, industry 'self-regulation', 'co-regulation' and formal law. A number of scenarios can be imagined which would provide the impetus needed for progress to be made towards easier security, in particular by means of baseline security for small organisations, and suites of inbuilt security features in consumer products.
The power of the nation-state is on the wane, and corporations are increasingly large, powerful and transnational. Individual States are limited in their capacity to impose consumer protective measures on corporations whose primary business activities are elsewhere, and are timid in doing so. The USA is the primary country of domicile of supranationals, and it consistently favours corporate freedoms over the protection of consumers' privacy.
The US Administration has been seeking to impose its world-view on other countries by means of provisions in international trade agreements whose effect is to greatly reduce national sovereignty and preclude most countries from enacting laws to the detriment of supranational corporations. Meanwhile, although the EU occasionally rattles its sabre, it continually drops short of its stated intentions, as occurred with its meek acceptance of the US 'Safe Harbor' scheme and of transborder flows of financial data and passenger data.
On the one hand, it would seem that the frequency and seriousness of data breaches is building the momentum needed for change, and that the hands of legislators and regulatory and oversight agencies will be forced. On the other hand, the scope for meaningful legislative action is progressively diminishing. The more probable scenario is that the level of harm to organisations' own interests may become so great that they may discover the need to take action themselves, and to fund technology providers to improve their offerings.
The current vogue among large corporations is to outsource substantial proportions of economic activity to smaller organisations whose profit-margins they are able to squeeze. One result of this is that their own security risk profile becomes to at least some extent dependent on those of their contractors. In particular, organisational vulnerabilities arising from BYOD practices may cause organisations to fund security features for consumer devices, and security training for their staff in the use of consumer devices.
If some variant of this scenario does emerge, how long will the trickle-down effect take, and when will Nell's device gain a reasonable level of protection? The Conventional Security Model The conventional computer security model is adopted in this paper e.
Any entity that has a material interest in the security of an Asset Asset: Anything to which a Stakeholder assigns value and which therefore requires protection. An Asset may be physical or intangible. Assets include people, property, financial assets such as cash and deposits, data and reputation Harm: Negative impact or damage to an Asset.
Harm may be of any kind, particularly economic, but also including social and psychic impact Threat: A category of circumstances that could give rise to Harm to an Asset. A Threat may be: A specific occurrence of a Threat Security Incident: Your support enabled a pm that this audiobook could primarily Thank.
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